Mr. Ellison is charged with possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), a single felony count arising from a traffic stop. He is out of custody. The 48.6 grams recovered from the center-console compartment is the spine of the case, and the search that produced it is the spine of the defense: the lawfulness of that search decides everything Ex. 7, DA-000341. Preliminary hearing was continued to June 9, 2025. The production reviewed here is the People's first.
The production is the arrest/investigation report, DR# 25-041987 DA-000112 to 000121; Deputy Vance's body-worn camera DA-000205; the Unit 12 dash-camera DA-000206; the CAD dispatch log, incident CAD-25-118732 DA-000230 to 000234; property/booking and the criminalist lab report DA-000341; DA-000360; and the court docket. One item the record squarely implicates was requested and not produced: the K-9 field-performance and deployment log for K-9 Argus [GAP]. The dash-camera was produced as a transcoded file only, with a roughly 40-second gap over the search moment and no native original or hash [GAP].
A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable; once the defense shows the search was warrantless, the People must prove a valid exception (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357). Findings 1 through 3 support a motion to suppress the fentanyl and its fruits, and a Franks challenge to the report. Prolonging the stop to await the dog was independently unlawful absent reasonable suspicion (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348). The report's alert-then-search recital, contradicted by the officer's own body camera and the CAD log, is the kind of deliberate or reckless falsehood that is excised and the balance tested (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154). The search came before the claimed probable cause existed.
Framework: Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531. First, K-9 Argus's field-performance and false-alert log was requested and withheld [GAP], and it is directly material to alert reliability (Florida v. Harris (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 247): a Brady demand plus a Pitchess request on the handler and dog. Second, Dep. Vance is a Pitchess candidate on veracity: the on-tape "sort out the PC later" remark (Finding 2) and the false report sequence (Findings 1, 3) put his truthfulness squarely in issue (Pen. Code, § 832.7).
A draft demand letter to the DDA is staged for your review Deliverable 03. A draft motion to suppress on Findings 1 through 3 is staged for your review Deliverable 02.
I. Introduction. Defendant moves to suppress 48.6 grams of suspected fentanyl and all fruits of its recovery. The People's sole articulated basis is a K-9 alert. The arresting deputy's own body camera and the dispatch log foreclose it: the console search began at 02:11:07, and the K-9 unit did not arrive until 02:14:22, so the search preceded the claimed probable cause by roughly three minutes (BWC Vance 09:20; CAD #011).
II. Statement of facts. Deputy Vance stopped defendant's vehicle for a purported window-tint violation, ordered defendant out, then opened the driver's door and searched the center-console compartment. The report recites that K-9 Argus alerted first and the search followed (R1, p.5 ¶4). The records contradict that sequence: the BWC fixes the search at 02:11:07; the CAD log fixes the K-9 unit's arrival at 02:14:22; and at 02:12:44, on the BWC, Vance tells the handler, "Just start writing, we'll sort out the PC later" (BWC Vance 10:57). The probable cause was written after the search.
III. Argument. A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, and the People bear the burden to prove a valid exception (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119). The search cannot rest on probable cause that did not yet exist: the compartment was searched at 02:11:07, before the dog arrived at 02:14:22 and "alerted" at 02:15:36. Prolonging the stop to await the dog was independently unlawful absent reasonable suspicion (Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348). The vehicle-search exception does not save it, because defendant was already out and detained and the offense of arrest was itself the product of the search (Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332). The report's alert-then-search recital is a deliberate or reckless falsehood material to probable cause; the tainted portion is excised and the balance tested (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154). All evidence derived from the unlawful search is suppressible as fruit of the illegality (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471).
IV. Conclusion. The motion should be granted and the fentanyl suppressed. The single count rests entirely on the console contents, so suppression is case-dispositive. Defendant reserves the right to supplement upon production of the native dash-camera, its metadata, and the K-9 field-performance log, each demanded and outstanding.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: [SET] [YOUR FIRM]
By: /s/ [Your attorney of record], Attorney for Defendant
[DATE] · Via email and U.S. mail
Deputy District Attorney Lauren Pryce
Re: People v. M. Ellison, Case No. SV-2025-CR-041987
Dear Counsel:
We have reviewed the People's first production. Three items are outstanding. We demand them under Penal Code section 1054.1 and Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, as each is material to the defense:
The arrest report recites that the K-9 alerted before the search and supplied probable cause. The body-worn camera and CAD log already produced show the console search began at 02:11:07, before the K-9 unit arrived at 02:14:22. The outstanding items bear directly on that dispute and are favorable and material within the meaning of Brady. Please produce them within ten days, or advise us of the basis for withholding so we may seek relief from the court.
Very truly yours,
[Staged for your attorney's signature]
Officer P. initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle owned by Mr. M., citing an alleged missing front license plate (Veh. Code, § 5200(a)) and inoperable brake lights (Veh. Code, § 24250(a)). Nothing indicated the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime, and nothing indicated Mr. M. was under the influence Ex. 3, police narrative.
The body camera contradicts the stated basis for the stop. The front plate was present, and dispatch confirmed registration and insurance current and valid in Mr. M.'s name Ex. 4, p.2 to 3. Officer P. claimed an odor of marijuana, yet no smoke left the vehicle and no marijuana or paraphernalia was recovered Ex. 2 at [00:33]; Ex. 3. He reported "red and watery eyes"; on the footage Mr. M.'s eyes appear clear Ex. 5. A sealed alcoholic beverage sat in the backseat, but Mr. M.'s blood alcohol content was 0.0 percent Ex. 3, p.5.
Without articulating probable cause, Officer P. removed Mr. M. from the vehicle and patted him down. Although the footage shows no movement by Mr. M., the officer alleged he "became tense," and, without a Miranda advisement, moved to arrest him. By the officer's own report, he struck Mr. M. twice in the face during the arrest Ex. 2 at [04:28]. Only then were the vehicle and its contents searched.
The warrantless search and arrest were unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment bars warrantless searches subject only to narrow exceptions (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357), and the People bear the burden of justifying one (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218; United States v. Carbajal (1993) 956 F.2d 924, 930). Probable cause requires more than a hunch (Wimberly v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 557, 564; Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696).
The stop lacked a valid basis, because the cited violations were not observed and the registration was valid (People v. Reyes (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856). The DUI investigation had no factual basis: a 0.0 percent reading, no contraband, clear eyes. The custodial arrest violated Miranda and lacked probable cause (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 758 to 760).
The allegations indicate a violation of the Racial Justice Act, Penal Code section 745(a), which may be shown through the totality of the stop and arrest (see Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138; Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) 600 U.S. 181). Suppression is governed by Penal Code section 1538.5 (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 126 to 127; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873).
The Court should suppress all tangible and intangible evidence obtained from the unlawful stop, search, and arrest, and dismiss the charges.